Th e paper is motivated by a desire to fi nd common ground between main-
Introduction
Th e themes of the 2008 Research Network Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies conference are to examine the changes that are taking place in mainstream economics; to establish what, if any, is the new orthodoxy; and to identify the implications for post-Keynesian economics. In particular, the conference organisers have asked contributors to examine the role of fi scal policy in both mainstream and post-Keynesian macroeconomics with a view to establishing whether there is any possible common ground between them. Th is is the task we have set ourselves in this paper. In what follows we distinguish two categories of post-Keynesian economics. Th e category that has its origins in Keynes we designate as post-Keynesian (JMK). Th e category that has its origins in Kalecki we designate as post-Keynesian (MK).
In a sense, our task is a ›mission impossible‹ because the principal emphasis of mainstream macroeconomics is on monetary policy, denying any substantive role for fi scal policy, except possibly in times of severe recession. On the other hand, the principal emphasis of post-Keynesian (JMK) macroeconomics is on fi scal policy, rejecting many of the mainstream criticisms of fi scal policy as groundless or irrelevant. For as long as mainstream and post-Keynesian (JMK) economics maintain their entrenched stances, we see little prospect of a meaningful dialogue emerging between them. Rather than sit uncomfortably sandwiched between Scylla and Charybdis, 1 we concentrate on an area in which mainstream economics recognises that fi scal policy, in particular tax policy, has an important, perhaps critical, role to play, namely, the control of greenhouse gas emissions and show how postKeynesian (MK) economics may provide common ground on which a useful dialogue may take place. In the mainstream view, taxes on greenhouse gases are usually intended to correct for negative externalities by changing relative prices, and, in so doing aff ect the aggregate level of economic activity. In the post-Keynesian (MK) approach, greenhouse gas taxes have both short-period and long-period eff ects that will be considered below.
Th e following is in seven sections. In Section 2 we review briefl y the current mainstream stance on fi scal policy. In Section 3 we discuss the dominant post-Keynesian (JMK) approach. In Section 4 we identify the main features of the post-Keynesian (MK) approach to fi scal policy that distinguish it from the post-Keynesian (JMK) approach. In Section 5 we discuss the role of taxation in a Kaleckian growth model. In Section 6, we demonstrate how a Kaleckian approach to the taxation of greenhouse gas emissions can infl uence the rate of innovation. In Section 7, we show how policy measures to stimulate innovation may be thwarted by a political innovation cycle. Finally, in Section 8, we consider what common ground there may be between mainstream and post-Keynesian (MK) economics on the interaction between tax policy and innovation. 1 In Homer's Th e Odyssey, Odysseus had to navigate between these two natural elements, monster and whirlpool respectively, that threatened the ship. Similarly we need to navigate between two opposing schools of thought.
Role of tax policy in the mainstream fi scal policy stance
Contemporary mainstream macroeconomics identifi es itself as the New Economic Consensus (NEC) and is an amalgamation of the developments in macroeconomics from the post-war neo-Classical Synthesis to the present day. Its defi ning characteristic is the claim that choice-theoretic micro-foundations determine macroeconomic outcomes. In order to explain aggregate employment and output, all macroeconomic models must, according to the NEC, incorporate individual inter-temporal decision-making based on rational expectations. Within this framework, however, there are still disagreements as to the role of fi scal policy (Tcherneva 2008) .
Having virtually abandoned fi scal policy during its monetarist phase, there are now infl uential voices within NEC that recognise it may have a limited role to play (Bernanke et al. 2004 , Krugman 2005 . Th is concession stems from recognition that there may be circumstances, for example when the short-term rate of interest falls to zero, under which no further economic stimulus from monetary policy is possible. However, within the NEC coterie, fi scal policy is viewed very much as a measure of last resort to be used only in periods of extreme defl ation despite its distortive and infl ationary eff ects. It is now accepted by Bernanke (2003a) , among others, that in the short run fi scal authorities may have important reasons for deviating from a balanced budget (or budget surplus) stance when faced with national emergencies or deep recessions (e.g. the 2008 global fi nancial crisis). In the long run, however, the fi scal disciplines of the balanced budget and responsible levels of national debt must be maintained.
An important feature of the emerging NEC stance on fi scal policy is that the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis which had previously precluded fi scal policy eff ectiveness may not hold. Th is opens the possibility that wealth eff ects from defi cit spending may aff ect aggregate demand. Abandonment of Ricardian equivalence raises the fear that governments may lose fi nancial discipline and incur ever-rising debts. Sustainability of a government's budget is a major concern for NEC economists. Th e NEC overwhelmingly subscribes to the doctrine of ›sound fi nance‹ to avoid the distortive and infl ationary eff ects of government spending. Th e dominant NEC view is that the principal goal for fi scal policy is to avoid an intolerable tax burden on future generations. Th e inter-temporal budget constraint is an important underlying condition for understanding the role of fi scal policy from a NEC perspective.
Th ere is widespread agreement in the NEC that fi scal policy is inherently infl ationary and that its use should be restricted to defl ationary conditions. At all other times, monetary policy should dominate and fi scal policy should remain passive and be automatic, transparent, credible and rule-compliant. Th ere is a strong supply-side predilection in the NEC so that if fi scal policy is deemed necessary it should take the form of tax cuts and not increases in government spending.
Th e fi nal issue we consider is the NEC view of the link between fi scal policy and full employment. Th e NEC dynamic general equilibrium model does not admit the existence of involuntary unemployment. Th is marks a complete break from Keynes whose revolutionary raison d'être was to fi nd a cure for involuntary unemployment.
Th is necessarily brief summary of the NEC stance on fi scal policy confi rms that except under the direst of circumstances it is to be avoided like the plague, bringing with it as it does all sorts of unwelcome complications such as infl ation and resource misallocation. For the NEC ›sound fi nance‹ and balanced budgets are the sine qua non of responsible macroeconomic fi scal policy. Th ere is, however, one important area in which the NEC sees positive merit in fi scal policy and that is the area of climate change where the use of taxes is advocated as an important instrument in controlling the levels of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere (Stern 2006) . We return to this issue in more detail in Section 6 below.
Post-Keynesian (JMK) Stance on Fiscal Policy
Th e post-Keynesian (JMK) camp takes a diametrically opposite view of the role of fi scal policy. In terms of achieving macroeconomic coordination and stabilisation objectives, postKeynesians (JMK) such as Arestis and Sawyer (2004) see fi scal policy as a more potent instrument than monetary policy, although, surprisingly, they give little credit to Kalecki's contribution. Post-Keynesian (JMK) analysis revives Lerner's (1943) functional fi nance approach in which fi scal policy is to be judged not by ex-post budgetary results but by its real eff ects on the economy. Governments face no limits to their spending and the role of fi scal policy is to spend as much as is necessary to bring the economy to full employment. Although Arestis and Sawyer identify a number of NEC assumptions that undermine fi scal policy eff ectiveness, they argue that the post-Keynesian (JMK) functional fi nance approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the NEC. Th ey reject crowding out and add to the criticisms of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.
Th e type of fi scal policy advocated by post-Keynesians (JMK) is one that encourages investment and growth. For example, Arestis and Sawyer write: »Fiscal policy of the ›functional fi nance‹ type boosts aggregate demand, and thereby has a stimulating impact on investment, which raises the future productive capacity of the economy […] . Th e growth rate may thereby be favourably enhanced by fi scal policy.« (Arestis/Sawyer 2004: 139) Th is version of the post-Keynesian (JMK) functional fi nance approach stimulates investment and growth and aims to reduce the demand gap. It is not dependent on any particular type of public spending or investment. Th ese are critical issues to which we return in more detail below. Th e main virtue of this post-Keynesian (JMK) approach is that it always raises aggregate demand, unlike in the NEC where fi scal policy only has demand side effects in non-Ricardian regimes.
For both the NEC and the post-Keynesians (JMK), the barrier to attaining full employment is infl ation although the latter have a diff erent interpretation of infl ation. Post-Keynesians (JMK) see no single NAIRU (Non-Accelerating-Infl ation-Rate-of-Unemployment) but rather a fl uctuating structuralist infl ation barrier whose level depends on a number of factors such as capacity utilisation and the rate of growth of capital stock. With a fl uctuat-ing infl ation barrier, ›full employment‹ is given by the employment level when aggregate demand hits this barrier. Th us, a number of levels of full employment exist depending on the level of aggregate demand and the location of the infl ation barrier.
Th e principal feature of the post-Keynesian (JMK) approach is its belief in the eff ectiveness of fi scal policy which contrasts with its relative ineff ectiveness in the NEC view. Th e post-Keynesian (JMK and MK) approaches reject the crowding out eff ect, Ricardian equivalence, and the fi xed supply assumptions of the NEC. Whereas the NEC treats the growth rate as given, in the dynamic post-Keynesian (JMK) approach as advocated by Arestis and Sawyer, growth rates will change in response to changes in government spending so that fi scal policy need not run into traditional budget constraints. In contrast to the NEC, both post-Keynesian approaches consider the aggregate income/output and employment eff ects of broad based taxes, like greenhouse taxes, through channels other than the traditional supply-side channels of NEC.
Fiscal policy: Keynes or Kalecki?
Th e ghost of Keynes is present at both the NEC and post-Keynesian (JMK) feasts. Th e NEC is determined to exorcise it once and for all while post-Keynesians (JMK) are keen to resuscitate it. However, Keynesian fi scal policy is not the only post-Keynesian game in town. Kalecki has at least as strong a claim as Keynes as the founder of post-Keynesian economics (Harcourt 2006 ) and a stronger claim for primacy on the role of tax policy (Asimakopulos 1978) . Kalecki (1937) recognised that the publication of Keynes' General Th eory required a whole new approach to the study of taxation. He worked through the short-period macroeconomic eff ects of taxes on commodities, incomes and capital but never explicitly incorporated taxation into his subsequent dynamic analyses. Asimakopulos and Burbidge (1974) published a fully developed short-period Kaleckian model. Laramie and Mair (2000) integrated Kalecki's theories of taxation, income distribution, income determination, investment, business cycle and growth.
Th ere are a number of important, and sometimes subtle, diff erences between Keynesbased and Kalecki-based approaches to fi scal policy which we summarise using fi ve concepts in italics below.
Balanced budget. Both the post-Keynesian (JMK) and the post-Keynesian (MK) approaches identify the macroeconomic short-period eff ects within a balanced budget regime without requiring any changes to aggregate government taxation or spending. In the JMK approach, the eff ect of a balanced budget tax change, and, therefore, the size of the balanced budget multiplier depends on relative propensities to save of those being taxed or those receiving transfers. For example, a redistributive balanced-budget tax is a tax on high-income groups (with high propensities to save), balanced against transfers to low-income groups (with low propensity to saves). Th e net eff ect stimulates aggregate demand.
In the MK approach, the eff ects of balanced budget changes in taxes on aggregate income/output and employment depend primarily on how the tax change aff ects aggregate pre-tax profi ts as national income is pushed up to a level so that pre-tax profi ts are realised. Kalecki showed that post-tax profi ts (the sum of profi ts after taxes plus profi t taxes) equal the sum of private investment, the government budget defi cit, the trade surplus, and consumption out of profi ts less savings out of wages. Given that the wage share is determined by the degree of monopoly as refl ected in price/prime costs mark-ups, inter alia, the aggregate level of income is pushed up to the point where pre-tax profi ts, as described before, are realised, and the wage bill is paid. If changes in wage taxes are shifted, business mark-ups will fall, and higher levels of national income and employment will be required for aggregate profi ts to be realised. If changes in profi ts taxes are shifted, business mark-ups will increase, and a lower level of national income will be required for aggregate profi ts to be realised. An increase in the profi ts tax balanced against a decrease in the wage tax, leads to an increase in short-period pre-tax profi ts, national income and employment. 
Increase in Aggregate Profits
Note: *Th e short-period incidence and eff ects of tax changes (where fi xed investment expenditures are given by past investment decisions) depends on the government budget stance, the marginal propensity to save out of wages, the marginal propensity to consume out of profi ts, and the degree of tax shifting through changes in business price/cost markups. Th e long-period incidence and eff ects of tax changes (where fi xed investment expenditure change in response to determinants) incorporates the impact of short-period eff ects on current period investment decisions and future investment expenditure. **If the marginal propensity to save out of wages is nonzero, then the decrease in wage consumption relative to the wage bill is dampened. Th e result is a traditional balanced budget eff ect where profi ts and national income rise. Th e rise in profi ts, and the increase in national income, capacity utilization, increase fi xed investment in the long-run. ***If the price-cost markup decreases, as the wage tax is shifted, the wage bill and wage bill's share of national income increases. Th rough technical progress, the relative real cost of operating existing fi xed capital rises and increases the relative rate of depreciation to existing fi xed capital, and encourages investment in technological innovation. Note: *If the propensity to save out of wages is nonzero, the balanced budget increase in the profi ts tax increases the wage bill, reduces consumption relative to the wage bill, reduces after-tax profi ts, and dampens the increase in pre-tax profi ts and national income. **If the profits tax is shifted via an increase in price/cost markups, the wage share declines, the relative real cost of operating existing fixed capital declines, and depreciation declines, which discourages innovation.
Note that in the above balanced budget tax changes, the loss in post-tax profi ts due to increased profi t taxes is completely off set by the increase in wage consumption relative to the wage bill, if the marginal propensity to consume out of profi ts and the marginal propensity to save out of wages are zero. If these propensities are nonzero, then the eff ects on pre-tax profi ts, national income and employment will be dampened. Similar results are obtained, if the increase in the profi ts tax is balanced against an increase in government purchases. In contrast, an increase in the wage tax, balanced against an increase in government purchases, will stimulate profi ts, national income and employment, if the marginal propensity to save out of wages is nonzero. As evidenced, the short-period eff ects of balanced budget tax changes are similar between the JMK and MK approaches. However, the MK approach explicitly links the tax changes to aggregate business profi ts, which, in turn, lead to long-period eff ects on investment and growth (see Figure 1a and 1b).
Functional fi nance and functional distribution of income. Both post-Keynesian approaches recognise the importance of functional fi nance. However, unlike the post-Keynesian (JMK) approach, the post-Keynesian (MK) approach emphasises the macroeconomic consequences of fi scally-induced changes in the functional distribution of income.
Tax shifting and incidence of taxation. Tax incidence is applied income distribution theory. Th erefore, in studying the incidence of taxation it is important to specify on which theory of income distribution it is based. Th e post-Keynesian (JMK) approach does not specify its theory of income distribution. Th e post-Keynesian (MK) approach is explicit-ly based on the degree of monopoly theory of income distribution. Th e importance of tax shifting is recognised in the post-Keynesian (MK) approach and quite diff erent macroeconomic eff ects follow depending on whether or not taxes are shifted.
Fiscal policy and growth. Both post-Keynesian approaches emphasise the role of fi scal policy in promoting a faster rate of growth. In the post-Keynesian (JMK) approach, the mechanism operates via the impact of functional fi nance on aggregate demand, which in turn, stimulates investment and raises the future productive capacity of the economy. Th e post-Keynesian (MK) approach uses an investment model to identify the drivers of growth and the channels through which balanced changes in the structure of taxation will have an impact on investment and growth.
Fiscal policy and innovation. Th e post-Keynesian (JMK) approach treats the rate of innovation as exogenous and does not identify any role for fi scal policy. Th e post-Keynesian (MK) approach recognises that fi scal policy can stimulate innovation and then with a lagged impact on investment demand and growth, although its impact may be limited by a political innovation cycle (see Section 7 below).
Kalecki's original 1937 tax formulation and its subsequent extension by Asimakopulos and Burbidge (1974) are both short period approaches in which the level of investment is determined by decisions taken in some earlier time period. Th ey require to be incorporated in a dynamic model that seeks to identify the dynamic eff ects of fi scal policy as it impacts on investment, income distribution and growth. Th is we do in the next section.
In conclusion, both the JMK and MK approaches identify similar short-period eff ects of taxation. Th e JMK approach emphasises the eff ects of taxation on aggregate demand. Th e MK approach emphasises the eff ects of taxation on aggregate profi ts. By explicitly considering the aff ects of fi scal policy on aggregate profi ts, the MK approach allows for the dynamic, long-period, eff ects of profi ts to be explicitly considered. Th is becomes central to the greenhouse gas tax analysis in Section 6 below.
Role of taxation in a Kaleckian growth model
Having identifi ed the most important diff erences between the two post-Keynesian approaches to fi scal policy, we now proceed to illustrate in more detail how changes in the structure of taxation with a balanced budget can impact on the rate of growth in a Kaleckian growth model. In particular, we show how taxation can have an impact on the rate of innovation.
Our starting point is Kalecki's (1971) theory of investment. Recall in the Kaleckian approach, the macroeconomic impact of taxation depends on: the relative marginal propensities to consume out of wages and profi ts; whether compensating changes exist in the government budget; the extent to which a tax change is shifted through changes in business mark-ups.
A critical element in the Kaleckian approach is the pricing behaviour of fi rms as this determines whether or not changes in the taxation of wages or profi ts result in changes in business mark-ups and in the distribution of income. Kalecki's theory of profi ts is made dynamic by linking taxation to his theories of profi ts, national income determination, income distribution, investment and growth. For Kalecki, everything is driven by what happens to investment. Changes in the structure of taxation today can aff ect investment and, thus, profi ts, tomorrow.
In Kalecki's theory of investment, taxation aff ects investment through three channels: the level of profi ts; the rate of depreciation; the capacity utilisation rate.
In turn, the eff ect of taxation on the level of profi ts operates through two channels (ignoring the foreign sector) as described before: the impact on the government budget position; the eff ect on income distribution.
For example, a balanced budget increase in the profi ts tax, in the manner described above, increases pre-tax profi ts, leaves after-tax profi ts unchanged, and increases national income if the marginal propensity to save out of wages is zero and the marginal propensity to consume out of profi ts is zero. Th e increase in national income, given the wage share, increases the wage bill and after-tax wages. If the marginal propensity to save out of wages is positive, the increase in after-tax wages will increase worker savings and will reduce consumption relative to wages. Th e decline in consumption relative to wages dampens the increase in pre-tax profi ts and reduces after-tax profi ts.
2 Th e reduction in after-tax profi ts slows down the rate of growth in investment. Th e dampening eff ect is reduced if the profi ts tax is shifted via an increase in business price-costs mark-ups. Th e increase in the mark-ups reduces the wage share, dampens the increases in the wage bill and in worker savings. By dampening the increase in worker savings, the decrease in after-tax profi ts is dampened.
In contrast, a balanced budget increase in the wage tax will have no eff ect on pre-tax and post-tax profi ts and investment, if the marginal propensity to save out of wages is zero. If the marginal propensity to save out of wages is positive, the balanced budget increase in the wage tax will reduce worker savings, and increases pre-tax and post-tax profi ts and will increase investment. Th is increase is dampened to the extent that workers are able to shift the tax via a decrease in price-cost mark-ups. Th e decrease in price costs mark-ups increases national income and the wage bill and increases worker savings (reducing consumption relative to the wage bill) (see Figure 1a) .
Th e rate of depreciation channel operates by altering the relative profi tability of existing and new plant and equipment. With technological innovation through time, unit production costs associated with new capital goods decrease. Th is decrease in unit production costs shifts profi ts from old capital goods to new capital goods and increases the depreciation (and eventual obsolescence) of old capital goods. Kalecki (1971) illustrates the depreciation eff ect, in a no tax world, by assuming that the profi ts captured by new investment embodying innovation, and lost to existing capital, are proportional to the diff erence between national income and profi ts (the wage bill). In a world with taxes, a balanced budget increase in the profi ts tax increases national income relative to post-tax profi ts, and, given the rate of technical progress, increases the profi ts captured by new investment encouraging investment, and reducing the profi ts captured by existing capital. Th is increases the rate of depreciation and obsolescence of existing capital. In contrast, a balanced budget increase in the wage tax, if the tax is not shifted, has no impact on national income relative to post-tax profi ts and no eff ect on depreciation or investment. Th is result is modifi ed if the wage tax is shifted, via a decrease in the price-cost mark-up. Th e decrease in the mark-up increases the national income relative to post-tax profi ts, and accelerates the profi ts captured by innovation, encourages new investment, and decreases the profi ts captured by existing capital, accelerating its depreciation.
Th e economy's trend growth rate can be aff ected by changes in the structure of taxation when both the rate of capacity utilisation and business balance sheets matter in making capital investment decisions (Courvisanos 1996: 103 -106) . Businesses are assumed to desire a certain rate of capacity utilisation. An increase in the rate of capacity utilisation above the desired level will accelerate expansions and dampen contractions in investment. A decrease in the rate of capacity utilisation below its desired level will dampen expansions and accelerate contractions in investment. As implied above, tax policy -by aff ecting the level of national income -can change the capacity utilisation rate and impact on investment decisions through this channel. For example, a balanced budget increase in the profits tax, when the marginal propensity to save out of wages is zero and the tax is not shifted, may increase investment by increasing national income and capacity utilisation (as in the JMK approach). Likewise, a balanced budget increase in the wage tax, when the propensity to save out wages is positive, can also increase national income and capacity utilisation (see Figure 1b) . Business balance sheets are incorporated by taking into account the fi rm's gearing ratio (the ratio of total liabilities to net worth) in order to capture the eff ect of increasing risk associated with investment (Kalecki 1971 ).
Tax policy and the rate of innovation
Having established the channels through which taxation can impact on investment and then through investment on the growth performance of the economy, we now introduce the link from investment to innovation. Th is will enable us to model the impact of tax policy changes on the rate of innovation and the dynamics of economic growth. Th e link is through the concept of the margin of obsolescence (Bloch et al. 2007) . Th is concept relates to the decision rule on innovation. Investment in capital equipment that embodies best practice technology is a specifi c form of innovation. When fi rms make a decision to invest in plant and equipment that embodies new technological knowledge, whether that knowledge is related to products or processes, technological innovation (TI) takes place. Salter (1966) provided a seminal analysis of how technical change comes about through capital accumulation by focusing on the reverse side of innovation, that is, on technological obsolescence (TO). Salter (1966: 54) defi ned TO as »plants which are suffi ciently outmoded to be profitably replaced«. At any time, with both new and established knowledge, there is a spectrum of techniques used in production, ranging from ›up to date‹ to ›outmoded‹ to ›ob-solete‹. Th ere are a number of factors that determine investment decisions in addition to TO. Th ere is no inevitability that fi rms will automatically make investment decisions immediately to order the most up to date capital equipment. Th is may be due to fi nancial constraints, wage costs, industry competitiveness (or lack of ) and the level of technological fl exibility (or inertia). By defi ning TO in terms of cost minimisation, Salter provides a method of identifying how and when fi rms fi nd it profi table to invest in the TI embodied in the newest vintage capital equipment. Th us, technical change through TI becomes endogenous to the investment process. Salter (1966: 74 -5) argued that the ›margin of obsolescence‹ appears in a particular plant when the unit total (operating plus fi xed overheads) costs of production using bestpractice capital equipment equals the unit operating (materials plus labour) costs of production of the oldest vintage capital equipment. On the ›margin of obsolescence‹ the capital stock in a particular plant will be such that the implications, from a cost minimising perspective, to stay with the existing stock or invest in new equipment are identical. Salter's concept of the ›margin of obsolescence‹ can be linked to Kalecki's investment function through capacity utilisation on the basis that the ›margin of obsolescence‹ can be alternatively identifi ed as the point at which the total cost of new capacity equals the operating cost of existing outmoded capacity. Th us, when the total cost of new capacity becomes less than the operating cost of existing capacity, then existing ›marginal‹ capacity becomes TO. Salter's contribution is a clear decision-based convention or rule for when new TI should be introduced into the investment ordering process, subject to growth in demand. Kalecki's (1954) degree of monopoly and TI are linked via four potentially quantifiable determinants of the degree of monopoly: the role of giant fi rms; the development of sales promotion through advertising, selling agents etc.; the infl uence of changes in the level of overhead costs in relation to prime costs; and the power of trade unions. From a theoretical perspective, TI should be incorporated into investment theory as innovation alters the incentive to invest by »changing the costs of production» or »altering product demand« (Bloch et al. 2007: 5) . Th is is what Kalecki (1954: 17 -18) intended in his formulation of the degree of monopoly. »Changing the costs of production« is encapsulated in his identifi cation of the »role of giant fi rms« (industry concentration and economies of scale), »chang-es in the level of overhead costs in relation to prime costs« and »the power of trade unions« (wage costs); while »product demand« is encapsulated in »the development of sales promotion« (product diff erentiation).
Kalecki's theory of income determination states that profi ts (capitalists' income) is primarily determined by capitalists' spending (investment) decisions in a previous time period. Businesses, being motivated by technological innovation to improve their degree of monopoly, increase their investment expenditures, and these investment expenditures generate additional aggregate profi ts. If the result of the innovation-induced investment is an increase in the degree monopoly, changes in income distribution will result. Th is may, in turn, subsequently aff ect future investment decisions through the profi ts, deprecation, or capacity utilisation eff ects, described earlier.
Econometric results obtained by Laramie et al. (2004) show that both ›costs of production‹ and ›product demand‹ factors have infl uenced the degree of monopoly in UK manufacturing industry in recent years. Th ese results endogenise the eff ects of technical change on the degree of monopoly. Technical change, in a monopoly-capital scenario, encourages investment and increases profi ts, the wage bill, and national income. However, if the benefi ts of technical change are captured exclusively by businesses, business mark-ups increase, the wage share will decrease, which further will increase the level of profi ts through a reduction in worker savings, but will dampen the investment-induced increase in the wage bill and national income. In addition, by reducing the real costs of production (increasing profi ts relative to national income), this income redistribution eff ect of technological change reduces the rate of depreciation and slows down the eff ect of technical change on new investment. Accordingly, we expect technologically induced changes in investment to move in cycles (for empirical evidence see Courvisanos/Verspagen 2004) . Th e potential result is a contradiction between technologically induced growth and income distribution, which will give rise to cycles and to trends at below the level of full employment.
Th e Salter (1966)/Bloch et al. (2007) approach identifi es a clear decision rule as to when a fi rm should adopt the most recent TI and undertake the necessary capital investment. We now consider how the introduction of taxation may infl uence this decision rule. Two conditions must hold. First, the introduction of taxation must increase the after-tax operating (material and labour) cost of existing capital equipment relative to the after-tax total cost of best-practice capital equipment, or, in the Salter (1966) /Bloch et al. (2007) terminology, ›accelerate TO‹. Second, the introduction of taxation must increase the aftertax profi tability of best-practice capital equipment relative to its pre-tax profi tability, or, in Kaleckian terminology, ›increase the rate of depreciation‹. If these two conditions do not hold, then altering the structure of taxation has no role to play in infl uencing innovation, obsolescence or the rate of depreciation.
Assuming the two conditions above hold, the decision rule analysis is carried out in a time-dated framework, so that future costs and profi ts are expressed in discounted values. We begin by assuming that the fi rm is operating in time period t with existing capital equipment and operating cost, OC t . Th e fi rm has to decide whether to replace this existing equipment in time period t + τ with best-practice capital equipment with total cost TC t+τ . We assume that the operating and overhead costs of producing with best-practice capital equipment in t + τ are known with certainty in time period t. Th e Salter et al. decision rule applies when TC t+τ = OC t . Th e operating cost of best-practice equipment, OC t+τ , must be less than OC t , otherwise the decision rule will not be operational, i.e. OC t+τ < OC t . However, overhead cost, OHC t+τ , will be greater than OHC t because of higher amortisation charges consequent on investment in best-practice capital equipment, i.e. OHC t+τ > OHC t , ceteris paribus.
Th e Salter et al. rule only relates to fi rms' costs and does not specify a profi t condition. Th us, we specify a net profi t (P) condition that P t+τ > P t . If the fi rm is applying the Kaleckian mark-up pricing rule, it follows that the mark-up, k, in t + τ has to rise, i.e. k t+τ > k t . Th is is because the application of an unchanged mark-up to the lower operating cost, OC t+τ , (to determine price per unit of output) inevitably means that, with the higher overhead cost, OHC t+τ , profi ts in t + τ will be lower, i.e. P t+τ < P t . Th us, the Salter et al. rule may be a necessary condition but is not a suffi cient condition for TO. A necessary condition for TI to result in an increase in profi ts, thereby encouraging investment, is that price/cost mark-up on output associated with new equipment must increase. Th at is, the rate of depreciation must also be such that P t+τ > P t . However, as indicated above, a rise in mark-ups has consequences for the distribution of income. Th e mark-up-induced decrease in the wage share dampens the eff ect of TI (TO of existing capital) on depreciation and investment. For this dampening eff ect to be small, the eff ect of the technological change on aggregate business mark-ups would have to be small (although perhaps large for some fi rms or industries).
We now consider how the introduction of taxation aff ects the above conditions. We illustrate the eff ect by reference to the introduction of a tax on the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). We accept all the effi ciency arguments in favour of GHG taxes to ensure that GHG emissions are priced to refl ect the damage they cause (Stern 2006) . We identify two Kaleckian categories of GHG tax (GT). Th e fi rst is levied on GHG emissions associated with the production of production-goods (GTP), e.g. coal-fi red electricity and fl eet cars. Th e second is levied on the GHG emissions associated with the consumption of wagegoods (GTW), e.g. tourist travel and personal (non-luxury) cars.
If there is to be an increase in TO of high GHG emissions from existing capital, the gap between OC t and OC t+τ has to widen. Th is can only occur in response to an increase in GTP or a shifted increase in GTW. Th is happens because operating costs (including wage costs and profi t taxes), OC t , are higher than OC t+τ , an increase in GTP and a shifted increase in GTW will have a relatively greater impact on OC t than on OC t+τ . A tax-induced stimulus to TO will be generated and the real costs associated with existing capital equipment at time period t will rise, thereby stimulating the rate of depreciation. However, GTW shifting implies an inverse relationship between the mark-up and GTW. Shifting of GTW will, therefore, result in a fall in the mark-up. With GTW shifting, the wage share increases, and the wage costs of operating existing capital rise relative to costs of operating new equipment. Th is in turn, will increase the relative profi tability of new equipment and reduce the relative profi tability of existing equipment, which will thus accelerate its depreciation.
With this modifi cation, we examine fi rst an increase in GTW. Th e eff ect of a shifted increase in GTW on the level of profi ts, P t , will depend on the extent to which the shifting will increase the wage share, the wage bill, and workers' savings. When workers' savings are zero, a balanced budget tax change will have no eff ect on post-tax profi ts, P t . It is, therefore, not inconceivable that the increase in GTW in time period t would have no eff ect on P t although it is more likely that P t will fall, if GTW is shifted, and workers have a positive propensity to save. An increase in GTP and a shifted increase in GTW in time period t will give a kick-start to TI (and result in existing capital stock gradually becoming obsolete).
We now consider how the fi rm will respond to this stimulus and how fi scal policy can infl uence that response. In time period t the fi rm recognises two consequences of these changes. First, it has a stronger fi nancial incentive to replace its existing capital equipment; and, second, when GTW is shifted, its degree of monopoly has fallen, as witnessed by the fall in its mark-up. Th e fi rm must, therefore, seek to enhance its degree of monopoly, i.e. increase its mark-up, in order to make investment in TI fi nancially viable in time period t + τ. In either case, the fi rm attempts to shift these tax eff ects by accelerating the rate at which it innovates.
From the above analysis we can see that a tension exists between the eff ects of taxes on GTP and investment, and the eff ects of taxes on depreciation and investment. Balanced budget increases in GTP, when un-shifted and when workers' propensity to save is zero, have no eff ect on pre-or after-tax profi ts, but this increases operating costs and accelerates the margin of obsolescence of existing equipment while stimulating TI. Balanced budget increases in GTW, assuming workers' propensity to save is zero, when shifted, have no eff ect on after-tax profi ts, but instead increase national income through an increase in the wage share, and, like GTP, accelerate the margin of obsolescence of existing equipment.
Th ere exists a balanced budget tax change that will accelerate the margin of obsolescence with positive eff ects on after-tax profi ts and the level of national income. Note that currently, no GHG taxes exist. Th us, the proposed balanced budget tax change is a combination of (i) an un-shifted increase in GTP and (ii) an un-shifted reduction in existing wage good taxes. Assuming no change in workers' savings and a non-zero positive capacity utilisation reaction coeffi cient, this tax package is conducive to innovation. Figure 1a and 1b summarise the tax change channels of infl uence to induce low GHG emissions technological innovation under specifi c conditions.
Tax policy and the political economy of innovation
Having established the conditions under which the government can use balanced changes in the structure of taxation to infl uence positively the margin of obsolescence, the question arises whether it will in fact actually do so. Th is parallels the question Kalecki posed in relation to the attainment of full employment in Political Aspects of Full Employment (PAFE) (Kalecki 1943) . While he and Keynes had provided the policy tools and techniques that could ensure full employment, Kalecki, from a political economy perspective, recognised that sustained full employment in a capitalist economy would be unattainable. In the context of a capitalist policy solution, Harcourt (2006) refers to this as ›Th e Kaleckian Dilemma‹. Kalecki (1943) identifi ed the fears that capitalists have of full employment -loss of economic control and industrial control. Mair and Laramie (2002) develop this further by arguing that through the process of forming distributional coalitions, business interests can ensure that they do not lose these controls, thereby preventing a permanent and sustained attainment of full employment. Steindl (1979) , Bhaduri and Steindl (1983) and Catley and McFarlane (1981) have provided empirical evidence of a Kaleckian-type political business cycle (PBC) in advanced industrial economies such as USA, UK and Australia. Courvisanos (2009) applies Kalecki's PAFE approach to innovation. Whereas in the original formulation of PAFE and its subsequent development, innovation played only a minor role, Courvisa-nos (2009) argued that analogous to PAFE, the ›political aspects of innovation‹ (PAI) can also be identifi ed in the recent experience of mature industrial economies.
Analogous to PAFE, the PAI approach identifi es three fears that capitalists have with innovation:
-Loss of economic control with respect to their individual market power as innovation encourages new entrants that have the potential to reduce the incumbents' market share and ability to control the market.
To counter this threat, governments are persuaded by business interests to introduce various innovation policies to support incumbents, research and development (R&D) subsidies to support incremental innovations, patent protection and other intellectual property rights. -Loss of policy control as innovation becomes distributed across society through public institutions and public infrastructure that creates the national innovation system. To counter this threat, governments are persuaded by business interests to develop various strategies that support incumbents to regain some policy control, notably privatisation, public-private infrastructure programmes and public contracting. -Loss of industrial control of the workforce if governments maintain industrial relations policies that refl ect the full employment-type, high-union membership structures of the 1950s and 1960s.
To counter this threat, governments are persuaded by business interests to introduce new industrial relations policies in the name of innovation aimed at supporting and encouraging ›fl exibility‹ in the workplace. Th is fl exibility relates to the ability of fi rms to alter labour costs and structures when they introduce new process innovations that require less (and more fl exible) labour.
Kaleckian tax analysis: A pathway to common ground with NEC
As we have shown, there are fundamental diff erences within the post-Keynesian approaches to fi scal policy. In favour of the Kaleckian approach, it has the major advantage of being a balanced budget approach and, consequently, satisfying the NEC cardinal rule of ›sound fi nance‹. Also, with its emphasis on the revenue side of the budget, the Kaleckian approach of balanced changes in the structure of taxation is more in tune with the supply side orientation of the NEC. Indeed, as we have shown in Section 6, a Kaleckian GHG tax operates by off ering fi rms a fi scal ›incentive‹ which under certain conditions will accelerate the obsolescence of existing high GHG emissions plant and equipment and undertake new low GHG emissions technology investment. Th e NEC has a morbid fear of infl ation. To the extent that this is attributable to increased government spending, this fear is allayed by the balanced budget approach. Th e mantra of full employment does not arise in the Kaleckian approach. As early as 1943, Kalecki recognised that while full employment might be a technical possibility, the pressure of business interests would ensure it would be a political impossibility. Similarly, as we have shown in Section 7, while fi scal policy may have a stimulating eff ect on innovation, again the pressure of business interests will generate a political innovation cycle so that the full economic impact of innovation will never be achieved. NEC economists need not lie awake at nights worrying about the infl ationary implications of Kaleckian fi scal policy.
A feature of the NEC approach, which fi nds a resonance in the Kaleckian approach is ›crowding out‹. For the NEC, ›crowding out‹ is a physical concept in which the demands of the public sector for land, labour and capital elbow out the needs of the private sector, resulting in infl ation and resource misallocation. Th e Kaleckian concept is more subtle and refers to the reaction of the business class to fears of a loss of political and economic control as the state ›crowds out‹ the private sector by extending its activities into spheres which had been the traditional preserve of the private sector (Kalecki 1943) . But the NEC faces its own dilemma over Ricardian equivalence. Fiscal policy eff ectiveness can only be realised by abandoning Ricardian equivalence and the strict rationality assumption on which it is based.
Perhaps the most fundamental diff erence between the NEC and post-Keynesian (both varieties) approaches to fi scal policy is their stances on fi scal policy and growth. For the NEC fi scal policy has no contribution to make to growth and, at best, is a short-term palliative to be considered only when the economy is in the grips of serious recession. Th e post-Keynesian (JMK) approach recognises that fi scal policy contributes to growth by an expansion of aggregate demand resulting in an increase in investment, productive capacity and growth. But in the Keynesian ›functional fi nance‹ approach this increased investment need not be anything more sophisticated than the purchase of shovels for the purpose of digging holes and fi lling them in again. Again, the Kaleckian approach is more subtle. It specifi es the determinants of investment and identifi es the channels through which changes in the structure of taxation can have an impact on these determinants. As we have shown in Section 6, the Kaleckian fi scal approach endogenises innovation so that fi scal policy can, under certain conditions, encourage an acceleration of low emissions technical progress, if the political aspects of innovation can to some extent be nullifi ed.
